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III.

ARGUMENT

A.

DEFENDANTS DID NOT MEET THEIR BURDEN OF PRODUCTION ON THE
ISSUE OF ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE

i. The Citi Appellees mis-state the legal standard for summary
judgment. The Citi Appellees' opposition to Victor's case rests entirely on a
series of ipse dixits, factual mis-statements or mis-constructions of the law. In
particular, they allege:
The additional steps Appellees took to show that they were not timely
served and that they did not have actual knowledge of the underlying
action were not necessary to prove the lien void — the lien was prima
facie void because of the absence of the lis pendens. Appellees bore
the burden of introducing evidence of the exceptions. Appellant never
met that burden, below or on appeal.1
First, the Citi-Appellee incorrectly state the legal standard on summary judgment.
Although at trial Victor would bear the burden of proof on whether the Citi
Appellees received actual knowledge of Victor's lien action within 180 days, at
the summary judgment stage of the proceeding it is the Citi-Appellees that must
make an affirmative factual showing that Victor is not entitled to the benefit of the
actual knowledge exception stated in Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-1 l(3)(a).
The summary judgment standard asserted by the Citi Appellees was

1

Aple. Br. p. 27.
1

explicitly rejected in Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, which clearly distinguishes
summary judgment practice in Utah from the rule stated in Celotex v. Catrett, Ml
U.S. 317,106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986). In construing the summary
judgment procedure under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, Celotex held that when the burden of
proof at trial will be on the non-moving party, the moving party will be awarded
summary judgment if it simply identifies:
"'those portions of fthe pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any,' that it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact.' Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). The burden then
shifts to the nonmoving party to show, by 'rebuttal affidavits, or other
specified kinds of materials,' that there is a genuine issue of material
fact. A/, at 324r2
Thus, under Celotex proof that the non-moving party has not provided evidence
that it can carry its burden of proof at trial is sufficient to grant the moving party
summary judgment.
Implicitly relying on the Celotex standard, the Citi Appellees incorrectly
argue that at the summary judgment stage Victor "bore the burden of introducing
the exceptions." If Celotex was controlling, this might well be dispositive of their
summary judgment claims. But under the very definite and specific holding of
Orvis, the Celotex standard has been rejected. Orvis holds that Waddoups v.

2

Orvis at 1115, citing Celotex v. Catrett, Ml U.S. 317,106 S. Ct. 2548, 91
L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986).
2

Amalgamated Sugar Co., 2002 UT 69, 54 P.3d 1054. (the case relied upon by
those arguing that the Celotex standard controlled in Utah) cannot be interpreted

"mean that a movant can satisfy her burden on summary judgment by
"challenging] an element of the nonmoving party's case!f~in effect,
by pointing out that the nonmoving party lacks sufficient evidence to
support his claim. This interpretation overlooks the movant's
affirmative obligation to first demonstrate that there exists no genuine
issue of material fact."3 (citations omitted)
Orvis expands on this rule by being even more explicit:
A summary judgment movant, on an issue where the nonmoving party
will bear the burden of proof at trial, may satisfy its burden on
summary judgment by showing, by reference to "the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any," that there is no genuine issue of
material fact. Upon such a showing, whether or not supported by
additional affirmative factual evidence, the burden then shifts to the
nonmoving party, who "may not rest upon the mere allegations or
denials of the pleadings," but "must set forth specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. (e). This is the correct
application of Harline, and any subsequent cases applying Harline
differently are incorrect.4[underlined emphasis added, other emphasis
in the original]
Note that the court unmistakably requires that the moving party employ
affirmative factual evidence to put into issue the non-moving party's ability to
prove at trial a matter for which the non-moving party bears the burden of proof.

3

Orvis atU 17.

4

Orvis aW 18.
3^

In so ruling, Orvis explicitly re-affirms as controlling the holding in Harline v.
Barker, 912 P.2d 433, 445 (Utah 1996) that:
"Unless the moving party meets its initial burden to present evidence
establishing that no genuine issue of material fact exists, 'the party
opposing the motion is under no obligation to demonstrate that there
is a genuine issue for trial.'"5
This re-affirmation of the holding in Harline refutes the Citi Appellees attempt at
page 25 of their brief to distinguish Harline from this case.
ii. The Beech and Flynn affidavits do not state any facts showing a lack
of actual knowledge. Second, the affidavits of Beech and Flynn do no more than
assert the legal conclusion that each of their corporations did not have actual
knowledge of Victor's lien action within 180 days of its filing. For example, Mr.
Beech avers that he "first learned of the existence and pendency of the abovecaptioned litigation att he time Direct Mortgage Corporation was served process
on June 14, 2006." (R. 141) But he says nothing about when Direct Mortgage
Corporation learned of the filing of Victor's lien action. Instead, he merely recites
that no one at Direct Mortgage Corporation had "actual knowledge" of Victor's
lien action prior to June 14, 2006. (R. 141).
All of the cases relied upon by the Citi Appellees regarding the waiving of
defects in affidavits address situations where there were factual averments in the

'Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433, 445 (Utah 1996) (quotingK&T, Inc. v.
Koroulis, 888 P.2d 623, 628 (Utah 1994)).
4

affidavits - albeit evidentiarily defective ones - supporting a claim for summary
judgment. Admittedly, if the Beech affidavit had contained unambiguous factual
allegations regarding when Direct Mortgage Corporation "first learned" of the
Victor lien action, regardless of whether the factual averments were evidentiarily
defective, they may well have put Direct Mortgage Corporation's actual
knowledge into issue. But the Beech affidavit does not contain unambiguous
factual averments, and by instead doing no more than reciting the legal standard of
actual knowledge imposed by Utah Code Ann. § 38-l-ll(3)(a), that affidavit put
nothing before the trial court from which it could conclude that Direct Mortgage
Corporation lacked actual knowledge.6
This is an important distinction. Mr. Beech's statement as to his personal
knowledge in the first sentence of paragraph 3 of his affidavit contrasts starkly
with his next sentence where,7 in speaking of the corporation, he can do no more
than draw a legal conclusion by reciting the legal standard of actual knowledge,

6

See Appl. Br @ pp.20 - 29 where it is argued that a likely inference from
the Beech affidavit's conclusory allegation regarding a lack of actual knowledge is
that Direct Mortgage Corporation had no way of knowing when it first learned of
Victor's lien action, and assumed that lack of reporting systems meant it did not
know of Victor's lien action until served.
7

When Mr. Beech is talking about his own personal knowledge he is
testifying affirmatively about matters which he saw, observed or participated in.
Indeed, he affirmatively states that he "first learned" of Victor's lien action when
Direct Mortgage Corporation was served with process. His affirmative use of a
non-legal term is clearly factual and not simply a conclusion of law. (R. 137).
S

something he is not qualified to do. Whether or not Direct Mortgage Corporation
had actual knowledge is a legal question and his recitation of the applicable legal
standard is not supported by any facts supporting this denial.8 Restated, although
evidentiary defects may be waived by a non-moving party's failure to oppose an
affidavit, under the holding in Badger v. Brooklyn Canal, 922 P. 2d 745 (Utah
1996) the affidavit must still recite factual allegations to support a claim for
summary judgment.
In Badger the court held:
"We find that the manner in which these affidavits were presented
provided an insufficient factual basis for the district court's ruling.
Ordinarily, the opponent to a summary judgment motion must 'set
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e). However, that burden is triggered only when 'a
motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in
this rule.' Id. (emphasis added). Unless the moving party meets its
initial burden to present evidence establishing that no genuine issue
of material fact exists, 'the party opposing the motion is under no
obligation to demonstrate that there is a genuine issue for trial.'
Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433, 445 (Utah 1996) (quoting K&T, Inc.
v. Koroulis, 888 P.2d 623, 628 (Utah 1994)). The Madsen affidavit
failed to negate any disputed issue regarding the impact of the change
in diversion points on the private wells. Whatever expertise Madsen
had acquired as an irrigator, it was not plainly pertinent to the
question of impact on water tables; nor did he provide any
foundational facts supporting his opinion. See, e.g., King v. Searle
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 832 P.2d 858, 864 n.2 (Utah 1992)
('Affidavits of experts are insufficient. . . unless foundational facts
are set forth supporting their opinions and conclusions.'). Rather, he

s

See Capital Assets Financial Servs. v. Lindsay, 956 P.2d 1090,1094 (Utah
Ct. App. 1998) (trial court must disregard legal conclusions in affidavits).
6

simply asserted in conclusory fashion that movement of water
upstream could not impact the water table near plaintiffs' wells."9
The conclusory statement at issue in Badger begged the question of what the
affiant actually knew or whether his conclusion was the result of mere assumption.
That is exactly the case with the Beech affidavit's conclusory allegations
regarding actual knowledge.
Goodnow v. Sullivan, 2002 UT 21, addresses the closely related issue of
whether competing inferences resulting from conclusory fact allegations presented
to a trial court prevent prevent the entry of summary judgment in reliance on those
allegations. Goodnow holds that summary judgment cannot be granted where
competing inferences are in issue.10 Applying Goodnow to Victor's case produces
the same result. Because there are a number of competing inferences which accrue
from the conclusory allegation of actual knowledge in the Beech affidavit, the trial
court could only resolve those inferences by weighing the evidence, which it
cannot do on summary judgment.
Note also, that in Badger the affidavit in support of summary judgment was
unopposed, which is also Victor's case. Badger was reaffirmed in the context of a
lay person's affidavit by Dixon v. Pro Image, Inc., 1999 UT 89,1138, FN7, where

9

Badger®

10

752.

Goodnow at 13.
7

the court found that the party moving for summary judgment similarly failed to
meet his initial burden of production to challenge the existence of an element of
the non-moving party's cause of action.
Moreover, under the authority of these cases, whether the Beech and Flynn11
affidavits support a claim to summary judgment is determined under a correction
of error standard, not an abuse of discretion standard.12
In sum, although objections to the admissibility of the Beech and Flynn
affidavits may have been waived, those affidavits must each still recite
unambiguous facts supporting the Citi Appellees' summary judgment claims based
on a lack of actual knowledge. Because they do not recite those facts, the Citi
Appellees failed to meet their burden of production on this issue and so did not
challenge or dispose of of an element of Victor's cause of action; that is, the issue
of whether the Citi Appellees had actual knowledge.
iii. At Summary Judgment the Citi Appellees Failed to Adduce Any
Evidence That They Had an Interest in the Subject Property, In a belated

11

Excepting for its omissions of any averment as to when Mr. Flynn first
learned of the filing of Victor's lien action, the Flynn affidavit does not materially
differ from the Beech affidavit.
12

See Stephens v. Bonneville Travel, Inc., 935 P.2d 518, 519 (Utah 1997)(on
appeal from the district court's ruling on summary judgment, an appellate court
applies a correction of error standard, affording the trial courtTs rulings no
deference).
8

attempt to bolster their case for summary judgment, at page 20 of their brief the
Citi Appellees erroneously contend that the allegations in each of their answers
that they had an interest in the property which was the subject of Victor's lien
action, supports their motion for summary judgment. But Victor's complaint
alleges that they have no interest or an interest which is inferior to Victor's.13
Utah cases repeatedly hold that a moving party can only meet its initial burden by
affirmatively producing dispositive evidence in support of its summary judgment
motion.14
Not only do the cases require the moving party to produce affirmative
evidence, it is obvious that if the non-moving party cannot rely on its pleadings,
the moving party cannot rely on its pleadings15 in support of its motion for
summary judgment, otherwise a summary judgment would be no more than a
motion to dismiss, and the factual allegations of the Plaintiff Victor's complaint
regarding Direct Mortgage Corporation's inferior interest in the subject property
must be taken as true.16
13

See Addendum A, 1115.

14

Orvis atU 18 citing Harline.

15

Appellant refers to pleadings in the strict sense used in Ut. R. Civ. P. 7(a).

16

See Russell v. Standard Corp., 898 P.2d 263, 264 (Utah 1995); cf.
Blujfdale City v. Smith, 2007 UT App 25; 756 P3d 175 (Ut. App. 2007) (failure of
non-moving party to specify in its opposing memorandum the evidentiary grounds
for disputing the moving party's statement of undisputed material facts warranted
9

At page 20 of their brief the Citi Appellees also contend that their
uncontested motion to substitute in CitiMortgage for Direct Mortgage Corporation
was somehow dispositive of the issue of whether it had an interest in the subject
property. But Rule 7(c)(3)(A) specifically provides that "Each fact set forth in the
moving party's memorandum is deemed admitted for the purpose of summary
judgment unless controverted by the responding party." By specifically limiting
this rule to summary judgment memoranda, this Rule necessarily excludes factual
assertions from other types of motions from its benefit.17 Moreover, the rule
requires that those factual allegations be supported by evidence adduced through
affidavits or discovery materials. Because CitiMortgage's motion to substitute in
as a party defendant in this case had nothing to do with a summary judgment
motion, the factual assertions in that motion to substitute are without evidentiary
effect.
This conclusion is further supported by the trial court's order granting the
Citi Appellee's unopposed motion to substitute CitiMortgage for Direct Mortgage
Corporation as a party Defendant. That order specifically finds that CitiMortgage

summary judgment). A fortiori if the moving party relies on its answer and fails to
adduce affirmative evidence in support of its summary judgment claims, those
claims must fail.
17

See Field v. Boyer Co., 952 P.2d 1078, 1086-87 (Utah 1998); 2A Norman
J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction 47:23-25 (2000).
10

should be siihstiiiitctf as ;i p;nt\ to? Dim m Mini gage t 'orpnmtion because
CitiMortgage's motion was unopposed, but makes

• ^gs regarding n e

unauthenticated and unverified Statement of Facts recited in the memorandum in
support of the motion to substitute CitiMortgage as a party. (R. 125) Accordingly,
the trial court's order allowing CitiMortgage to be substituted in for Direct
Ivluiigage Corporation made no determination as to whether Direct Mortgage
Corpora i

. ->

,.-•*

. •*

. • merest in the subject property.

Indeer
the subject property at the time \ -

••
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• *•
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-

. interest in
^

-

raised in any way in the Citi Appellees' summary judgment papers. Arguments not
briefed are waived.18 When they responded to Victor's Rule 59 memorandum, the
Citi Appellees made no reference to the factual allegations in their memorandum
in support of their motion to substitute in CitiMortgage as a party defendant, bul
instead (TiniienirJU i lainied dial ViUm Iliad admitted in its complaint that Direct
Mortgage Corpi>-'•'«»• -

•• -

-^

18

:

-•

See Semeco Industries v. State Tax Com fn, 849 F..
where the court held that arguments not briefed are waived
19

,K

- •

i -**r>)

Further, the Citi Appellees' argument was without merit. Victor merely
pled that Direct Mortgage Corporation u hold[s] some claim of right, title, or
interest to the aforementioned property and PLAINTIFF alleges that all [Direct
Mortgage Corporation's] claims of right, title or interest. .. [is] subject to the
prior claims and interests of PLAINTIFF .. ." Victor did not allege that Direct
Mortgage Corporation holds some right, title or interest in the subject property,
.1

failing to argue this assertion on this appeal to this Court, the Citi Appellees have
waived it.20 See Addendum A, 1115.
Moreover, if the Citi Appellees had raised the issue of Direct Mortgage
Corporation's interest in the subject property at the time of the commencement of
Victor's lien action, Victor would have put before the trial court a letter from legal
counsel advising that it had no interest in the subject property and was willing to
disclaim any interest in the subject property.21 This letter, which is an admission
against interest,22 and so would have been admissible into evidence, belies the
unproven assertion of CitiMortgage that Direct Mortgage Corporation transferred
an interest in the subject property to it.

but merely that it claims that it holds some right, title or interest in property. The
former is an admission that a defendant has some interest in property, whatever it
might be, but the latter is nothing more than an allegation that a defendant hold a
claim to an interest, but does not admit that a defendant actually has an interest.
20

Id.

21

See Addendum B.

22

Rule 801(d)(2)(c) of the Utah Rules of Evidence makes "a statement by a
person authorized by the party to make a statement concerning the subject", an
admission by a party-opponent admissible in evidence. Under common law a
statement by an agent can only be used against the principal if the agent is
employed for the purpose of making the statement on behalf of the principal. Rule
801(d)(2)(D) of the Utah Rules of Evidence goes even further and makes a
statement by a party's agent made within the scope of that agency admissible. See
United States v. McKeon, 738 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1984) where a statement made by
an attorney on behalf of his client was admissible under the federal version of both
of these rules.
12

As to the affidavit of Miriam Harper,, the Citi /::\ ppellees ne^ - er recited airy
undisputed material fact alleging that they had an interest in the subject property
and the exhibits to the Harper affidavit do not prove that Direct Mortgage
Corporation had an interest in the subject property when Victor filed its lien
action, nor do those exhibits show that the CitiMortgage is the successor in
ci\^

>, ..
• *

;rtgage Corporation

•>».
••T-;v!

• :

s 1 lave ai i ii iterest in the sub ject

property is to be found nowhere in their memorandi 1m in

rt of their motioi 1

for summary judgment. Rule 7(c)(3)(A) is explicit in requiring that a moving party
must assert in its statement of undisputed material facts a dispositive fact relied
upon in its motion for summary judgment. Victor cannot be expected to guess
which factual allegations (especially unverified factual allegations) stated
elsewl

. ," •

Appellees 11 ic; v. i

\ he trial court will be relied

recitation in their statement of material undisputed facts greatly pre judiccd V ictor
because it was denied the opportunity to produce the letter from legal counsel for
Direct Mortgage Corporation admitting it had no interest in the subject property,
and was denied an opportunity to bring a Rule 56(f) motion to conduct discovery
••at issue.

13

assert that they had an interest in the subject property and without that interest,
they could incur no harm as a result of Victor's lien action and so had no standing
to invoke the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-1 l(3)(a).
B.

THERE IS NO ISSUE OF INADEQUATE BRIEFING BY THE
APPELLANT
A Rule 59 motion tolls the time for filing of a notice of appeal.23 Victor's

notice of appeal recites that it is appealing from the "entire judgment of the trial
court/' which demonstrates that Victor is not merely appealing the trial court's
denial of Victor's Rule 59 motion. Further, both the January 16, 2007 order
granting the Citi Appellees summary judgment and the trial court's order denying
Victor a new trial covered the same ground: the merits of the Beech and Flynn
affidavits and the Citi Appellees' memorandum in support of their motion for
summary judgment. Accordingly, the trial court's order denying Victor's motion
for a new trial necessarily re-affirmed its January 16, 2007 order granting the Citi
Appellees summary judgment, meaning that both those orders are in issue on this
appeal.
Accordingly, this is not a case like Jensen v. Intermountain Power Agency,
1999 UT 10,117, where some claims were decided on partial summary judgment
and some were later decided by a jury, and in the notice of appeal only the jury
23

Moon Lake Electric Assoc., Inc. v. Ultrasystenas Western Constructors,
Inc., 161 P.2d 125 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
14

judgment was identified I here,, the claims were distinct, which meant that the

summary judgment were in issue on the appeal, and thi is depri ved the appellee of
an opportunity to file a cross appeal. Because in the case sub judice the Rule 59
proceeding reviewed in full the prior summary judgment proceeding and because
the trial court ruled in favor of the Appellee on all matters in issue, there is no
issue of prejudice and no question of whether the appeal includes all of the matters
dealt vv ith b> the trial court' s January 16, 200' 7 order granting the C iti Appellees
I 111 ill ill III 111 \

| U ( l gill H III

Instead, \ /• -.>r's Notice of \ ppeal conies w ithin the n lie stated in Scudder
v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 886 P.2d 48, (Utah 1994), where the court in
reviewing Ut. R. App. P. Rule 3(d) and the appellant's failure to identify in its
Notice of Appeal the intermediate orders which were to be raised as issues in the
appeal, held that the Notice of Appeal was sufficient to put those intermediate
.^nu, ;it was identified as the subject of the appeal.
' I he same r ationale applies to ^ ? ictor's N otice :)f \ ppe al In identify ing tt le
trial court's order denying a new trial and its final judgment of November 16, 2007
(mistakenly dated as December 16, 2007) denying Victor a new trial, and then
stating that the appeal is taken from the entire judgment, the Notice of Appeal put
into issue the Citi Appellees entire case for summary judgment, meaning that the
15

trial court's order of January 16, 2007, which is subject to a correction of error
standard, is properly before this Court.
Victor in its opening brief at page 3 properly recited the correction of error
standard for summary judgment rulings and then proceeded to brief for some 22
pages why the district court was wrong in law in granting the Citi Appellees
summary judgment. This briefing negates the Citi Appellees claim that there has
been no showing that the district court committed reversible error.
C.

THE CITI APPELLEES LACK STANDING TO CONTEST
VICTOR'S CLAIMS
As was shown in Victor's opening brief24, this was an in rem action and

unless the Citi Appellees had an interest in the subject property, they lacked
standing to contest Victor's lien. At a summary judgment hearing the Citi
Appellees, as defendants, must have some interest in the subject property before
they have standing to contest Victor's lien.25 This is especially so where Utah
Code Ann. § 38-1-1 l(3)(a) limits the right to the notice provided by the filing of a
lis pendens to persons with an interest in the subject property.26 In Estate ofHaro
24

App. Br. pp. 12-15.

25

Cf. State v. Taylor, 818 P.2d 561, 567 (Ut. Ct. App. 1991)(defendant must
be something more than a temporary visitor to a cabin to prosecute a 4th
Amendment objection to a search of the cabin); see also State v. Ross, 2007 UT
89,1f 25 (defendant not sentenced to death lacked standing to prosecute an 8th
Amendment challenge to Utah's death penalty statute).
26

App. Br. pp. 9 -12.
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decedent's heir or personal representative, then an action common^^H h i person other those designated by statute would be a nullity because they lacked
capacity to sue. 27
The fact that the Citi Appellees failed to make any showing that they had an
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essentially indistinguishable. Without that capacity, they could not be prejudiced
by Victor's lien action 28 and so had no standing to contest Victor's lien action.
The requirement that a litigant have an interest in the res which is the
sub(ei f 111 I he III igiil u Hi lias been frequently applied by the appellate courts of this
State to both Plaintiffs and Defei idai its I I: le cases ci:,

• •

u ~^ a oove are

representative of numerous criminal cases den> ing def endants standing to lai n ic 1 i
consititutional challenges to particular criminal statutes, and those cases closely
parallel cases like Wash. County Water Conservancy Dist. v. Morgan, 2003 UT

27

Haro at 880-81.

^State \ '. 7 i: i) 4oi ,81 8 1 " 2,c \i il 56" ;
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58, P 6 n.2, 82 P.3d 1125 (Utah 2003) in requiring litigants to have an interest in
the subject matter of the dispute before they have standing.
In that light, it would seem - with respect - that this Court's decision in
Victor Plastering, Inc. v. Swanson Building Materials, Inc., 2008 UT App 474,
represents a marked departure from a long line of cases which hold that where the
terms of a statute exclude a litigant from its entitlements, the excluded litigant
does not have standing to litigate the requirements of that statute, and on that basis
this Court's decision in Victor Plastering should be reconsidered.
IV.

CONCLUSION
The Citi Appellees failed to proffer any evidence in support of their claim

that they did not withing 180 days have actual knowledge of the commencement
of Victor's lien action. Absent that showing, the actual knowledge exception to the
lis pendens requirements in Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-1 l(3)(a) remains in issue and
Victor is entitled to a reversal of the trial court's grant of summary judgment in
favor of the Citi Appellees.
DATED this 15th day of January, 2009.

^_

RONALDAD¥^ttorney for the
Appellant Victor Plastering, Inc.
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ADDENDUM:
\mended Complaint of Victor Plastering, Inc.
U. July 3, 2006 letter from Direct Mortgage Corporation.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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"• % regoing A p p e l L i n l - i ' Uriel in tin 1 I mleil S t a l e s mail tirst i:lass p o s t a g e

pre-paid
LESLIE VAN FRANK
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C.
257 East 200 South, 7th Fir.
P.O. Box 11008
/ ^ l ^ ^
Salt Lake City UT 8 4 1 4 7 - 0 0 0 8 ^ / ^
^\

Secretary
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RONALD ADY (3694)
10 West 100 South, Suite 425
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801)539-1900
Fax: (801)322-1054
Attorney for Plaintiff

!N Till', FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATU 01 li I AH

VICTOR PLASTERING, INC,
AMENDED ('(IMI'I.AIN I1

CHRIS A. COLLINS, CHANNA COLLINS,
COBALT HOMES, INC. dba COBALT
HOMES STYLE BUILDER & COBALT
HOMES THE CEDARS L.L.C. dba
COBALT HOMES STYLE BUILDERS,
BRIAN K. BRADY, MASCO
CONTRACTORS SERVICES, DIRECT
MORTGAGE CORPORATION,
CONSTRUCTION PRODUCTS
COMPANY, SWANSON BUILDING
MATERIALS, INC., DAVE'S QUALITY
ROOFING, INC., CITIBANK FEDERAL
SAVINGS BANK and JOHN DOES 1
through 10.

'-U401255
Judge Hansen

Defendants.

For complaint again* ! >• fendants, Plaintiff alleges as follows:
1. !'i AJNTIFF is a Utah corporation its principal place of business in Utah County, State
of Utah.
2. Pi .AINTIFF is a stucco contractor duly licensed under the laws of the State of Utah.

3. Defendants Chris A. Collins and Channa Collins ("Homeowners"), own an interest in real
property located in Utah, State of Utah, having a legal description as follows: LOT 15, PLAT J2,
CEDARS AT CEDAR HILLS SUBDIVISION, CEDAR HILLS (the "Property"). The Homeowners
are named as defendants in this action solely for the purposes of proceeding against the real pioperty
described above, and not to obtain any judgment or relief in personam against Homeowners.
4. Defendant COBALT HOMES INC. and/or the Defendant COBALT HOMES INC. dba
COBALT HOMES STYLE BUILDERS is a Utah corporation doing business in Utah County, State
of Utah and at all times relevant to PLAINTIFF'S claims in this complaint, was licensed as a general
contractor in the State of Utah.
5. That the above-referenced property is a single family dwelling and may have been an
owner-occupied residence that is not offered for sale to the public within the meaning of the
Residence Lien Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act, Title 38, Chaptei l i of the Utah Code
(hereinafter the FUND).
6. That the Defendant Homeowners formerly occupied that residence or may have occupied
the residence, or that the residence was or, after completion of the construction on the residence, may
have been occupied by the owner or the owner's tenant and lessee as a primary ot secondary
residence within 180 days from the date of the completion of the construction on the residence.
7. That the Defendant Homeowner may have entered into a contract with Defendant
COBALT HOMES INC. (hereinafter referred to as the Defendant Contractor) for the construction of
an owner-occupied residence upon the above-described real property.
8. That on or about September 19, 2005 the Defendant Homeowners filed a petition in
bankruptcy under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
Southern District of California as case number 05-08818. On Schedule A of their Voluntary Petition
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in that bankruptcy they show the above-described real property with a current market value of
$208,000 and secured claims totaling $256,824.00. On Schedule C of that Petition they claim
$18,675.00 of that real property as exempt. In paragraph 15 of the Statement of Financial Affairs
attached to that petition, the Defendant Homeowners show that they last occupied the above-described
real property on January 5,2005. On Defendant Homeowners Statement of Intentions filed with that
petition, they identify the above described real property as "Property to be Surrendered"and list
Citibank and Citimortgage as the creditor's name relating to that property.
9. That the Defendant Contractor may have been a licensed contractor at all times when it was
building the aforementioned owner-occupied residence.
10. PLAINTIFF and Defendant Contractor entered into a contract under which PLAINTIFF
was to construct certain improvements to the Property on behalf of Defendant Homeowners.
11. PLAINTIFF first provided materials and labor for the Property on or about September 26,
2003.
12. On or about October 16, 2003, PLAINTIFF completed the contracted improvements to
the Property.
13. PLAINTIFF has demanded payment from Cobalt and Collins, who have refused to make
payment.
14.0n January 14,2004, PLAINTIFF recorded a mechanic's lien against the Property pursuant
to UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-7 (1953, as amended) in the amount of $16,250.00, notice of which
was mailed via certified mail to Defendants.
15.

That Defendants, CHRIS A. COLLINS and CHANNA M. COLLINS, MASCO

CONTRACTORS SERVICES, DIRECT MORTGAGE CORPORATION, CONSTRUCTION
PRODUCTS COMPANY, SWANSON BUILDING MATERIALS, INC., DAVE'S QUALITY
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ROOFING, INC., CITIBANK FEDERAL SAVINGS BANK and JOHN DOES 1 through 10 all hold
some claim of right, title, or interest to the aforementioned property and PLAINTIFF alleges that all
of the claims of right, title or interest of each of these Defendants and all persons claiming by,
through, or under them, are junior, inferior, and subject to the prior claims and interest of
PLAINTIFF, or that the claims, if any, of any other person or entity (Doe Defendants) who may assert
an interest in the properties should be litigated herein and priorities established.
CLAIM ONE: FORECLOSURE ON MECHANICS LIEN
16. PLAINTIFF incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the preceding
paragraphs.
17. As a result of the Defendant Contractor's breach of contract, PLAINTIFF has been
compelled to prepare and file Notice of Liens, a copy of which said Liens are herewith attached and
incorporated as Exhibit

IM,

AfI,f.

18. That if the Defendant Homeowners can establish that he or she has complied with the
FUND, he or she may become exempt from the Lien and Bond Statutes of the State of Utah. As
required by §38-1-11 of the Utah Code, a form ""Homeowner's Application For Certificate of
Compliance"" and Instructions are attached hereto as Exhibit ""B"" for the Defendant Homeowner's
use.
19. That pursuant to §38-1-11(4) (d) of the Utah Code, this Court must stay proceedings as
to the Defendant Homeowners until such time as the Defendant Homeowners have had a reasonable
period of time to establish compliance with §38-11-204(4) (a) and (4) (b) of the Utah Code through
an informal proceeding, as set forth in Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act,
commenced within 30 days of the owner being served summons in the foreclosure action, at the
Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing and obtain a certificate of compliance or denial

4

of certificate of compliance, as defined in §38-11-102 of the Utah Code.
20. That the Defendant Homeowners have had 30 days from the date of service of the
Complaint upon them in this action to complete and file the Homeowners Application for Certificate
of Compliance with the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing for the State of Utah,
as required by §38-1-11 of the Utah Code, in default of which the Defendant Homeowners lose the
protection they otherwise may have under the FUND.
21. That if the Defendant Homeowners cannot establish that they have complied with the
FUND, PLAINTIFF is entitled to a Decree of Foreclosure of PLAINTIFF'S Mechanic's Lien and to
an Order of Sale that the Sheriff conduct a sale and apply the proceeds from said sale first, to the cost
of sale; second, to the satisfaction of PLAINTIFF'S Lien, interest, Court costs, accrued interest
pursuant to statute and attorney's fees; and third, that any surplus be given to the rightful claimants
and owners.

CLAIM TWO: BREACH OF CONTRACT
22. PLAINTIFF incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the preceding
paragraphs.
23. Cobalt has breached its contract with PLAINTIFF and PLAINTIFF is entitled to damages
in the contract amount of$ 16,250.00 or as may be proven at trial plus accrued interest pursuant to
statute.
CLAIM THREE: UNJUST ENRICHMENT
24. PLAINTIFF incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the preceding
paragraphs.
25. PLAINTIFF has provided materials and services to Defendant(s) equal to or in excess of
the amount of $16,250.00.

•
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26. The materials and services provided by PLAINTIFF have increased the value of the
properties where the materials were placed and/or the value of the Defendant Contractor's business.
27. Upon information and belief, PLAINTIFF alleges that Defendant, BRIAN K. BRADY,
who is the controlling and operating shareholder behind the Defendant corporation, COBALT
HOMES INC., has been unjustly enriched in the amount of $16,250.00 or the Defendant, COBALT
HOMES INC., has been unjustly enriched in the same amount.
28. PLAINTIFF is entitled to compensation from Defendants, COBALT HOMES INC.,
and/or BRIAN K. BRADY for the value of the services and material provided and for the amount by
which Defendant has been unjustly enriched, which amount is $16,250.00, plus interest through
October 16, 2003 and continuing interest thereon from said date at the rate of 12% per annum until
paid as provided by Section 58-55-603 of the Utah Code Annotated (1953), plus any costs of court
and attorney's fees as allowed by Rule 73 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
29. Defendants have refused to make payment to PLAINTIFF for the material and services
provided and to allow Defendants to retain the benefit of the materials and service provided by
PLAINTIFFS will unjustly enrich Defendants.
30. Therefore PLAINTIFF should be allowed to recover from Defendants COBALT HOMES
INC., and/or BRIAN K. BRADY the value of the materials and services rendered in the amount of
$16,250.00, plus interest through Febnruary 3, 2006 and continuing interest thereon from said date
at the rate of 12% per annum until paid as provided by Section 58- 55-603 of the Utah Code
Annotated (1953), plus any costs of court and attorney's fees in order to prevent unjust enrichment.
WHEREFORE, PLAINTIFF prays for relief against Defendants as follows:
1. For judgment against the Defendants, BRIAN K. BRADY, and COBALT HOMES INC..
for breach of contract in the amount of $16,250.00, plus interest through October 16, 2003 and
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continuing interest thereon from said date at the rate of 12% per annum until paid, plus attorney's fees
in the amount of at least $775.00, as allowed by Rule 73 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, by
contract and by UCA 38-1-18 et sec, plus all costs of Court.
2. For a declaration that but for the Defendant Homeowners chapter 7 bankruptcy, Plaintiff
would be entitled to a judgment against the Defendant Homeowners, Chris A. Collins and Channa M.
Collins, in the amount of $16,250.00, plus interest through October 16,2003 and continuing interest
thereon from said date at the rate of 12% per annum until paid, plus Court costs, reasonable attorney's
fees of at least $775.00, as allowed by Rule 73 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,.by contract and
by UCA 38-1-18 et sec, plus all costs of Court.
3. That the Court adjudge that PLAINTIFF'S Lien, attached hereto, is valid and that
PLAINTIFF is entitled to the amount stated in said Lien, plus Court costs, reasonable attorney's fees,
and interest at the rate and in the amount allowed by contract and by law.
4. For an Order that PLAINTIFF'S Mechanic's Lien is prior to and superior to the interests of
all Defendants herein.
5. For a Decree of Foreclosure of PLAINTIFF'S Mechanics Lien and for an Order that the
Sheriff of Utah County conduct a sale and apply the proceeds from said sale first to the cost of sale;
second, to the satisfaction of PLAINTIFF'S Lien, interest, Court costs and attorney's fees; and third,
that any surplus be given to the rightful claimants and owners.
6. In the event that said sale is not sufficient to satisfy the entire amount of the lien, including
all applicable interest, Court costs, and attorney's fees, as proscribed by law, PLAINTIFF prays for
a Deficiency Judgment against the record owners of the property in the amount remaining due as to
said property, as provided for by §38-1-16 of the Utah Code Annotated(1953).
7. For an order of foreclosure of the mechanic's lien recorded by PLAINTIFF against, the
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Pioperty for the amount of$ 16,250.00 plus attorney's fees, court costs, and accrued interest pursuant
to statute;
8. For judgment against Defendants COBALT HOMES INC. for damages in the amount of
$16,250.00 and for a declaration that but for the Defendant Collins chapter 7 bankruptcy Plaintiff
would be entitled to a judgment against Defendants Collins and COBALT HOMES INC., jointly and
severally, for damages in the amount of $16,250.00;
9. For pre-judgment interest pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 15-1-1;
10. For such other relief as the Court deems reasonable in the premises.
Dated this 12th of April 2004.

RONALD ATTY
Attorney for Plaintiff
PLAINTIFF DEMANDS A JURY TRIAL
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NEBEKER

July 3, 2006

HAND-DELIVERED
Ronald W. Ady, Esq.
10W. 100 South, #425
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Re:
Stephen C. Tingey

Victor Plastering, Inc. v. Collins, et al.
Civil No. 040401255

\TTORNEY AT LAW
3
0 Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah
B4145-0385

36 South State Street

Suite 1400
Salt Lake City, Utah

34111
301 532-1500 FIRM
501 323-3360 DIRECT

301 532-7543 FAX
jt'ngey@rqn com
ivww rqn com

Dear Ron:
I represent Direct Mortgage Corporation ("DMC"). You have named
DMC as a party defendant in your recent Amended Complaint. My reading of
the Amended Complaint is that the claim against DMC is solely to foreclose
DMC's interest in the property. DMC no longer holds any interest in the
property. DMC would be willing to execute a disclaimer of interest in the
property, with the understanding that with that disclaimer, you will voluntarily
dismiss the Amended Complaint as to DMC. Please let me know if that
approach is acceptable to you. Thank you for your courtesy.
Very truly yours,
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER, P.C.

Stephen C. Tingey U I

SCT:LL
cc:
Direct Mortgage Corp.
880609/SCT

P R O F E S S I O N A L

C O R P O R A T I O N

